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Abstract 
 
Using a unique dataset for 14 transition economies, we propose a new measure for individual 
evaluations of transitional reforms, which we use to study, for the first time, the evolution of support 
for economic and political reforms from 1991 to 2004. We show that support for economic changes 
has been increasing over time after an initial drop, while support for political reforms has generally 
been higher. Support attitudes are lower among the old, less skilled, unemployed, poor, and those 
living in the CIS countries, especially during the 1990s. We also find evidence that transition-related 
hardship, opinions on the speed of reforms, political preferences and preferences towards 
redistribution, ideology and social capital matter. Finally, we show that individual preferences for 
state ownership and the quality of political institutions contribute mostly to explaining the lower 
levels of support in the CIS countries.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
In the last two decades former socialist countries went through the unprecedented experience 
of a parallel transition to a market economy and to democracy. Although the paths of reform 
implementation and the sequence of the reforms differed across countries, transitional reforms soon 
produced both economic “winners” and “losers” (Brainerd, 1998; Terrell, 1999), and for those who 
were less ready or able to face these changes, the costs of transition may well have outweighed, at 
least for some time, its benefits.  
Somewhat in parallel with the overall economic trends, life satisfaction in these countries 
collapsed in the beginning of 1990s and recovered subsequently (Easterlin, 2009), although it 
remained substantially lower than in Western economies (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009). 
Consistent with this and in a stark contrast with the pre-crisis strong economic performance, there 
was also a widespread dissatisfaction with the outcomes of transition. In 2007, 49 percent of 
respondents disagreed (and only 35 percent agreed) with the statement that the economic situation in 
their country was better than around 1989, with similar numbers corresponding to the political 
situation (EBRD, 2007a; Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009). Also privatization, one of the most 
important transition reforms, received low support, with over 80 percent of respondents willing to 
revise it (EBRD, 2007a; Denisova et al., 2009).  
To shed light upon the extent and evolution of public support for reforms, we employ a 
unique dataset, so far largely unexploited by economists, and construct new measures of support for 
the economic and political systems. These data allow us to document, for the first time, how support 
for the economic and political systems has been evolving in 14 countries over the entire transition 
period (1991-2004). We then analyze what factors have been driving these attitudes, how their 
impact changed throughout the period and why support was lower in some countries than in others.  
As new economic policies and reforms are scrutinized through the channels of representative 
democracy and of civil society, the support of the general public becomes a crucial factor for their 
successful implementation. A large theoretical political economy literature has shown that voters’ 
opinions are crucial for the successful implementation of reforms, and that interest group coalitions 
may influence or even reverse the reform process (see Roland, 2002, for a comprehensive 
discussion). Both ex-ante and ex-post political constraints are important, as feasibility constraints 
may prevent reforms from being accepted, while policy reversals can occur after reforms have been 
already implemented (ibid). Reforms are often adopted as part of a trial-and-error procedure under 
aggregate (as well as individual) uncertainty, and in the absence of credible compensating 
mechanisms for losers. Thus reforms may be resisted ex-ante even when they would be ex-post 
beneficial (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991) or, when enacted, they may face ex-post political opposition 
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from those who have experienced economic losses. Moreover, reforms are endogenous to the 
economic outcomes of previous reforms, and in particular to their distributional impact (Kim and 
Pirttilä, 2006). However, as the suddenness and spread of the transformation in transition economies 
were to a large extent unexpected and certainly unprecedented, it provides the context for a (quasi) 
natural experiment of reform adoption (Landier et al., 2008; Alesina and Fuchs-Schueldeln, 2007). 
This fact allows us to treat the initial reforms as a largely exogenous event, on the basis of which 
individuals then formulate their subjective assessments. This feature is unique to transition 
economies and would not hold in many development countries.  
Several empirical studies are relevant for the purpose of our work, including those that 
employ macro-economic variables to explain voting behavior (Fidrmuc, 2000), support for the 
market economy (Hayo, 2004; Kim and Pirttilä, 2006) or “capitalism aversion” (Landier et al., 
2008), as well as the recent cross-country studies that use micro data to analyze the “unhappiness in 
transition” (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009; Easterlin, 2009) or the determinants of support for a 
revision of privatization policy (Denisova et al., 2009).2 Most of the existing studies, however, either 
use aggregate level data or are limited to only one country or one year.3 Moreover, voting 
preferences are likely to be imperfect measures of attitudes towards reforms. Since institutions are 
different across countries, such indirect measures may reflect both attitudes and institutions (Scheve 
and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006). On the other hand, measures based on attitudes towards the 
“market economy” or “democracy” are also likely to be biased since, especially in the beginning of 
transition, respondents may not know the precise implications of these terms. In addition, many 
studies do not explore the motives for the widely diverging level of support for the new policies 
across different countries. Finally, due to the subjective nature of the information gathered from the 
survey data, individual-specific (as well as cross-country) differences in the interpretation of these 
questions and in the perceptions of scales are important and need to be taken into account (Bertrand 
and Mullainathan, 2001).  
 In this paper we attempt to overcome these problems by employing a unique data set 
of comparable surveys in 14 transition economies over 1991-2004, thus covering the entire period 
from the beginning of transition up to the first Eastern EU enlargement. We differentiate between the 
earlier period of recession (1991-1998) and the later period of economic growth (2000-2004). We 
propose a new measure of public support and distinguish attitudes towards the economic and the 
political systems. In addition to standard individual characteristics, we are able to analyze factors that 
are usually unobservable to researchers, such as individual preferences and values, social capital or 
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 See Rovelli and Zaiceva (2008) for a comprehensive review of related literature. 
3
 Easterlin (2009) and Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009) constitute an exception, but they analyze a different question. 
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ideology, as well as individual experiences with transition, perceptions of corruption and opinions on 
the speed of reforms. We also attempt to find some explanations for the lower support towards the 
reform process in several countries. Finally, we seek to reduce potential biases by constructing our 
dependent variable as a difference across evaluations for the same individual, thus differencing away 
individual and evaluation-specific factors, such as pessimism. To the best of our knowledge, our 
paper is the first one that analyses these questions using individual level data in a cross-country 
framework for this time span.4  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
the transition-specific background. Section 3 presents the data, discusses measurement issues and 
outlines the empirical model. The socio-economic determinants of individual attitudes towards 
changes in the economic and political systems are examined in Section 4. Section 5 suggests some 
potential explanations for the more critical attitudes towards transition in the CIS countries. Section 6 
presents sensitivity checks and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Transitional reforms in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
The implementation of political and economic reforms began in the early 1990s in most 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS). However, the paths of reform implementation and the sequence of the reforms differed across 
countries – a difference which is sometimes exemplified in the distinction between a so-called “big-
bang” approach and “gradualism”.5 The transition process has been characterized almost everywhere 
by an initial deep recession, which in many countries also involved widespread unemployment. 
However, the pattern, depth and duration of this transitional recession and the speed of the 
subsequent recovery differed considerably across countries, with CEE countries, on average, 
recovering faster. A common feature to all the transition economies was the need to refocus the 
orientation of international trade, to restructure internal production, and to reallocate labor across 
regions, sectors and firms (Campos and Coricelli, 2002). Privatization, trade liberalization, 
macroeconomic stabilization and economic restructuring took place in a situation of institutional 
change, where many institutions that had hitherto provided social protection collapsed and others, 
                                                 
4
 The sources of popular support for political regimes in general and democracy in particular have been analyzed widely 
by political scientists using, among others, data from the New Democracy Barometers (see, for example, Rose, 2007, 
Lazar, Mishler and Rose, 2007, Mishler and Rose, 2008, 2002, 2000a and 2000b). We also refer to these studies for the 
presentation of sampling framework, methodology and representativeness of this dataset. 
5
 Although a simplification and generalization, these definitions are useful for a general description of the transition 
process. See, for example, Roland (2002) for a comprehensive discussion of the political economy of transition and a 
survey of studies on economic policy reform. Note that countries differed also in the initial conditions, a fact that must 
be taken into account when modeling the outcomes of transition. 
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such as taxation or banking, had to be introduced practically ex novo. The initial stages of transition 
brought about remarkable increases in income inequality in all countries, including those that had 
managed to avoid large increases in unemployment rates (Milanovic and Ersado, 2008).  
One of the most important criteria for assessing the success of transition is a country’s 
achievement in reallocating labor (Boeri and Terrell, 2002). As transition generated an 
unprecedented economic insecurity, job insecurity became a crucial issue for many (Linz and 
Semykina, 2008). Low-educated, young, single individuals and women, especially married women, 
were more likely to become unemployed (Boeri and Terrell, 2002). Thus, transitional reforms soon 
produced both economic “winners” and “losers” (Brainerd, 1998; Terrell, 1999).  
The adjustment patterns of the output and labor markets differed substantially between the 
CEE and CIS countries. With a few exceptions, all Central and Eastern European countries 
experienced a U-shaped pattern of GDP, a large fall in employment early in the 1990s and some 
decline in labor productivity leading to rapid structural change but also to high unemployment (with 
the exception of the Czech Republic), much of which was long-term. In contrast, the CIS countries 
typically faced an L-shaped pattern of GDP during the 1990s and a relatively modest decline in 
employment with limited sectoral reallocations of labor. Here, however, there was a more 
pronounced deterioration in labor productivity and of real wages, as well as a significantly larger 
increase in inequality than in the CEE countries (Boeri and Terrell, 2002; Svejnar, 2002). Overall, 
while the labor market adjustment process took the form of larger declines in employment in the 
CEE countries, it typically occurred through real wage declines in the CIS. And only as transition 
progressed, unemployment began to increase gradually also in the CIS countries (Svejnar, 2002).  
A large literature on the optimal speed of transition has studied the speed with which an 
economy restructures and destroys the old jobs in the state sector (see, for example, Boeri, 2000 for a 
review). However, by focusing on speed and thus distinguishing essentially between a “big bang” 
versus a more “gradualist” approach, this literature fails to explain some key differences in the 
adjustment processes in the CEEC and CIS (Boeri and Terrell, 2002). Alternative explanations relate 
the differences in performance to differences in institutions. In particular, social safety nets and non-
employment benefits may have prevented the decline of wages in Central and Eastern Europe by 
setting floors to them (Boeri and Terrell, 2002). In addition, weaker legal systems and poor 
enforcement of laws and regulations in the CIS have probably encouraged both a profound lack of 
transparency in government and corporate recklessness, which in turn facilitated the spreading of 
corruption and rent-seeking behavior (Svejnar, 2002; Roland, 2002). In general, the literature stresses 
the advantages of adopting a political economy perspective and of taking into account also the role of 
noneconomic institutions, in order to explain the adoption and consequences of different policy 
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models in each country (Roland, 2002). In this paper we follow this approach to study the 
determinants and evolution of public support for transitional reforms. 
 
3.  Data and empirical model 
 
a) Descriptive evidence and measurement issues 
The data used in this paper come from the New Barometer Surveys (New Democracy 
Barometers). These are representative surveys of the populations in transition countries consistently 
collected over time by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy (CSPP) at the University of 
Aberdeen and the Paul Lazarsfeld Society, Vienna.  
As each survey round contains a large number of common questions, which are maintained 
across time and countries, the set of available surveys constitutes a unique dataset that allows 
meaningful cross-country comparisons across several years. This allows us to identify trends in 
political and economic transformations and also, given the composition of the questionnaires, to 
analyze the determinants of individual attitudes in the face of such changes. Surveys are undertaken 
independently from governments and face-to-face interviews are performed by trained interviewers 
working for established national research institutes in the national language (with the exception of 
the Baltic countries, Belarus and Ukraine, in which cases Russian was also used). The survey 
includes nationwide multistage random samples of around 1,000 respondents per country (in Russia 
– around 2,000) over 18 years old.       
We have merged several waves of the New Europe Barometer, the New Russia Barometer 
and the New Baltic Barometer data. The result is a pooled cross-section dataset for 14 transition 
economies, with surveys taking place in several waves between 1991 and 2004. Ten countries in our 
sample became members of the EU with the 2004 or 2007 enlargements (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,  Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), Croatia is currently 
a candidate for EU membership, while three countries are members of the CIS (Belarus, Russia and 
Ukraine). 
The set of explanatory variables employed in the regressions below includes standard socio-
economic indicators, such as gender, age, education, marital status, urban residence, employment 
status and household income. We supplemented these with data on macro-economic variables and 
political institutions. In the final sample we include all individuals with non-missing information on 
the key explanatory variables. Table A1 in the Appendix presents sample size by country. 
Definitions of the variables are given in Table A2.  
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The New Barometer Surveys include several questions on the degree of individual support (or 
opposition) towards the process of transition. For the purposes of this paper, we focus on the 
following sets of questions, which were included in all surveys:  
Economic evaluation: 
Q.1 “Here is a scale for ranking how the economy works (from +100 at top to -100).  
(a)  Where on this scale would you put the socialist economy before the revolution of 1989 / 
perestroyka? 
(b)  Where on this scale would you put our current economic system?” 
Political evaluation: 
Q.2 “Here is a scale for ranking how our system of government works (from +100 at top to -100). 
(a)   Where on this scale would you put the former communist regime / political system before 
perestroyka? 
(b) Where on this scale would you put our current system (with free elections  
and many parties)?”6  
[Insert Figure 1] 
As a first step, we examine the patterns of responses to these questions across time and 
countries. Figure 1 shows the proportion of positive, negative and zero evaluations of past and 
present economic (left panel) and political (right panel) systems for 1993 and 2004. For the 
economic system, a majority of respondents valued negatively the current system in 1993, while it 
gave positive evaluations in 2004. For the past economic system, a majority of respondents gave 
positive scores both in 1993 and 2004. The picture is somewhat different for the political system, as a 
majority of individuals evaluates positively both the past and the present system in both years, and 
the proportion of positive answers increases in 2004. Note also that neutral (zero) evaluations 
constitute only a small proportion in the overall poll.  
In principle, there are several alternative ways in which the evaluations presented above can 
be used to formulate an appropriate dependent variable for our analysis. For instance, should we 
focus only on individual judgments about the present system? Or instead on a comparison between 
evaluations for the present and the past? As we are interested in modeling the support for transition 
and reforms, a relative measure seems intuitively more appropriate, as it would reflect a comparison 
between the current and the past systems. Moreover, the answers to these questions may be related, 
inter alia, to whether the revision of opinions about the previous regime reflects a (selective) 
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 Note that the questions have been framed in accordance with country-specific situations. For example, “free elections 
and many parties” are not mentioned in the Russian questionnaire, and the questions are only about “the current system” 
and the economic or political systems “before perestroyka”. 
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forgetfulness of the past or a delusion about the present or, indeed, a mixture of both. Our a priori is 
that judgments about the past are meaningful, and that evaluating the past more favorably is part of 
the same process that results from a delusion about today’s experience. Accordingly, a judgment 
about the past is not only a historical assessment, but it also conveys information about the 
evaluation of the present system. In other words, statements about the past and the present are not 
independent of each other, but rather reinforce each other. To take this into account we compute our 
dependent variable by taking the difference (or “distance”) between the responses to Question (b) 
(present) and to Question (a) (past) for the economic and political systems, respectively. Thus, a 
larger positive (negative) difference implies a larger positive (negative) assessment of the present 
regime relative to the former one (in the economic or governmental dimensions, respectively). The 
larger is this distance, the more an individual is positive about the current state of the economy or 
polity, relative to the past, and thus, we assume, the more supportive he or she is for the reforms that 
have been adopted.  
In this context, it is important to note that differences in responses across countries may also 
arise due to different interpretations of the reference scale (-100; +100) in different countries and by 
different individuals, as they may be related to country-specific factors, such as culture. To this aim, 
we also standardize our dependent variable dividing it by its country (and year) specific standard 
deviation and control for country-specific effects in the regressions below. In this way we weight 
individual responses by a country and year specific variance, thus giving more weight to countries 
with relatively homogenous responses. A related problem that arises when using subjective data is 
that individual responses may be affected by several factors, such as the ordering of the questions in 
a survey, the exact wording of the questions or individual differences in the perceptions of the scale, 
which may introduce a measurement error (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). Note that the 
questions on the economic and political systems in our survey are usually asked at the beginning of 
the corresponding sections on the economy and public affairs, before the questions on the personal 
(or family) economic situation or on political preferences. Note also that taking differences across 
individual answers for the same person may difference away individual-specific and evaluation-
invariant factors such as pessimism or different individual perceptions of the scale, thus potentially 
reducing the associated biases. In section 7, we test the robustness of our results also in this respect.7 
[Insert Figure 2] 
Before proceeding to a more formal analysis, let us take a further look at the evolution of the 
support variables across time and for the individual countries. Figure 2 shows the developments over 
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 In general, we have extensively tested the sensitivity of our main results to alternative definitions of the dependent 
variable (see below). Overall, our main results were robust to such changes. 
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time of the support for the present and past systems as well as the corresponding “distance”. Support 
for the past economic system is quite high across 1991-2004, while it is much lower for the past 
political system (and negative at the beginning of the 1990s). The ranking of both past and present 
systems also tend to increase over time. Moreover, support for the past economic regime is always 
higher than for the present. On the contrary, the difference between the evaluations of the past and 
the present political systems is quite small from 1992 onwards. As a result, our “distance” measure 
has a U-shaped profile for the economic system, while for the political system it decreases sharply in 
the very beginning, decreases slowly until 1998 and increases rather slowly afterwards. This U-
shaped pattern in the support for economic transition is in line with Blanchard (1997), who argued 
that public support for reforms is U-shaped, following similar patterns in output and employment, 
and is also consistent with previous empirical results based on different data. However, we noted that 
only in a few countries the evolution of support follows the development of GDP over time. It is also 
worth noting that support for change in the political system (“distance”) appears larger than for 
change in the economic system. This is consistent with political economy approaches which suggest 
that more popular reforms should be implemented first, and with the observation that democratic 
reforms preceded economic reforms in all Central and Eastern Europe, since support for democracy 
was larger than for economic reforms (Roland, 2002).  
As these aggregate changes may be driven by changes in the composition of countries in our 
sample throughout the period, in Figure 3 we plot the evolution of “distance” in different countries. 
Over 1991-2004, the Czech Republic is the country with the largest support for both the economic 
and political reforms,8 while evaluations of the economic system change are the lowest in Ukraine, 
Lithuania and Russia and of the political system change – in Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. During 
1991-1995, the support was the lowest in Ukraine and Belarus, during 1996-2000 – in Ukraine and 
Lithuania (economic reforms) and Ukraine and Russia (political reform), while in the beginning of 
2000s it was the lowest in Russia and Slovakia for both. Figure 3 also suggests that support for the 
economic system change is increasing in many countries, while support for the political reforms in 
several countries is even decreasing, but is larger on average. 
[Insert Figure 3] 
 
Finally, in Figure 4 we plot the evolution of our standardized measures of support for 
transition together with the average of the EBRD Transition Indicators, for the countries included in 
                                                 
8
 The highest support in the Czech Republic is remarkably consistent with one of the “political economy puzzles in 
Central Europe” (Roland, 2002, p. 44), namely, the higher stability of the government of Vaclav Klaus in the Czech 
Republic (until recently), compared with governments in other transition countries; the fact that the Czech Republic has 
managed to maintain lower unemployment rates could be one of the potential explanations. 
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each year sample. While the Transition Indicator was improving during the 1990s, support for 
transition appears to have been decreasing; only after 2000 there is some evidence of positive co-
movement. One way to interpret this observation is that during the painful period of large 
adjustments and restructuring, public support for reforms may have actually decreased, and it may 
have started to increase only more recently, during the years of sustained growth.  
[Insert Figure 4] 
Summing up, on average citizens of many transition countries did not seem to give a 
favorable evaluation for the economic system they lived in, and they seemed to have regrets for the 
past. On the other hand, on average, they appeared reasonably satisfied with their current political 
system, but in some instances they still did not see it as an improvement over the past. This is true, in 
particular, of the current CIS members, but also several other countries, such as Lithuania, Latvia, 
Hungary or Slovakia express negative evaluations in certain periods. These findings, however, 
should not be interpreted as reflecting a desire to return to Communism, as among the respondents 
who give positive evaluations to the past economic or political system, only about 30 percent would 
actually agree to “return to communist rule”. Nevertheless, the fact that support for transition is so 
low may appear puzzling, at least prima facie, if we compare these responses with the evolution of 
most standard macroeconomic and institutional indicators, especially in the new EU member states. 
But these aggregate differences may be confounded by differences in individual characteristics and 
transition experiences. Moreover, country-specific macroeconomic policies and institutions may 
have also affected individual support attitudes. In the sections below we examine the role of these 
factors. Although some caution will be needed when interpreting some of our results as causal 
relationships, documenting the role of these factors will hopefully contribute to sheds additional light 
on the overall political economy of transition. 
b) The empirical model 
We model individual support for the economic and political transition assuming that it may be 
influenced by three sets of explanatory variables. First, standard individual socio-economic 
characteristics may help to sort out actual or potential “winners”, who are likely to support the 
transition process, from the “losers” who are unlikely to support it. Second, ideology and individual 
preferences and values (usually unobservable) may also influence individual support for transition, 
and excluding these variables could potentially confound the results. On the other hand, individual 
values and preferences are subjective, endogenous variables, likely to be shaped by individual socio-
economic characteristics, the performance of the system and the inherited cultural values. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to explore the correlation between these variables and support for 
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transition. Third, country-specific indicators for economic performance and institutions are also 
likely to be correlated with individual support for transition, as they would be in any model of 
rational political choice.  
We begin with the following simple specification of the baseline model:  
ijtjtijtijt XY εδβ ++=        (1) 
where ijtY  is our measure of support for transition for individual i in a country j in year t, ijtX  is a 
vector of standard individual socio-economic and demographic characteristics, jtδ  are the 
interactions between country-specific and year fixed effects and ijtε  is a random error term, which 
ideally should not be correlated with the rest of the variables. To analyze cross-country differences 
we also estimate the model with country-specific effects and time dummies entered separately.  
Next, we add to this baseline model a set of variables reflecting individual (subjective) 
preferences and values. As we noted above, these variables are likely to be endogenous and thus the 
parameters estimated have to be interpreted with caution, since the estimates are certainly not 
structural. Nevertheless, this inclusion allows us to measure the correlation between support for 
transition and, for example, preferences for redistribution or trust in political institutions, which is 
interesting per se. Overall, as we have access to a rich set of individual characteristics and cultural 
preferences, and we are also able to control for country-specific effects and trends, we believe that 
this might increase the reliability of our results with respect to earlier studies. 
As a further step, we introduce macro-economic and institutional variables into the baseline 
model, in order to capture the impact of each country’s economic performance and political 
institutions, and in particular to assess whether these contribute to explain the lower support for 
transition in the CIS countries:  
ijttjjtijtijt WXY εϕµθβ ++++=     (2) 
where jtW  are country-specific variables that vary over time, jµ  are time-invariant country fixed 
effects and tϕ  are year fixed effects.  
 
4. Who is against reforms?  
 
a) Determinants of reform evaluations and cross-country differences  
As we argued above, transitional reforms generate economic “winners” and “losers” 
(Brainerd, 1998, Terrell, 1999). People who would not benefit from or could not adapt to the 
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changing environment would probably not be in favor of the transition. For instance, as it has often 
been remarked,  older workers, women and those already unemployed or with obsolete labor market 
skills can be expected to oppose the transition reforms, as they might fear the decreased social 
security and increased unemployment risks. Also, individuals who had experienced the labor market 
under socialism probably have different attitudes than the younger cohorts. On the other hand, 
young, educated and wealthier individuals are more likely to support the process of transition, as they 
may benefit from the new opportunities that arise with it. Finally, subjective wellbeing may be 
affected by specific individual experiences, such as having to endure periods of economic hardship 
(Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009); these experiences are also likely to affect individual evaluations of 
the transition.      
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 1 reports the estimates of the baseline equation (1) for the evaluations of the economic 
and political systems. In both tables, the dependent variable is “distance”, i.e. the ranking of the 
present system relative to the past one. We first fit the models for the whole period and then analyze 
it across two sub-periods, “recession” (1991-1998) and “growth” (2000-2004), as individual 
evaluations may differ in periods with different economic conditions and reform progress. Our main 
findings are as follows. 
First, irrespectively of controlling for interactions between country and year-specific effects 
or entering them separately, the impact of individual characteristics remains largely the same, and is 
consistent with the “losers vs. winners” approach. The evaluations given by females, older 
individuals and those who are unemployed are generally more negative; while those given by 
graduates from universities or secondary or vocational schools or students, and those living in richer 
households are more favorable. The effect of urban residence is positive and significant in most of 
the regressions. There is also a positive and significant cohort effect for those who were 18 years old 
or younger in 1990 (and thus presumably had not experienced the labor market under socialism). The 
largest negative impacts are for individuals in their 50s and for the unemployed, while the largest 
positive effects are for the richest households and for university graduates. Country-specific effects, 
in general, confirm the descriptive evidence presented above: taking Slovenia as the reference 
country, individuals in the Czech Republic, Poland and Croatia are significantly more appreciative 
about transition, whereas those in the CIS countries are generally more negative.  
Second, there are several differences between the support for economic and political reforms. 
While support for change in the economic system was lower in 1990s relative to 2004, support for 
change in the political system is relatively stable. Note, however, that the composition of the sample 
with respect to countries changes throughout 1991-2004, therefore, a separate analysis on a country-
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by-country basis is also needed (see below). Also, the impact of most individual characteristics and 
country-specific effects is larger for the economic reforms than for political reforms (with some 
exceptions).  
Third, the impact of some individual characteristics changes between the 1990s and 2000-
2004. While the effect for females, older individuals, those living in cities and students is stronger in 
the 1990s, the impact of young cohort, education, single, higher income quartiles and also (for the 
economic system) of being unemployed is larger during 2000-2004. Also the effect of almost all 
country dummies is much stronger during the 1990s, which probably is one of the most interesting 
results of this comparison. During the 1990s, the largest negative country effects on the evaluation of 
the economic system were in Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania, while in the 2000s in Russia, Ukraine 
and Lithuania. For the political system, the largest negative effects in the 1990s were in Ukraine, 
Russia and Belarus, and during the 2000s in Russia, Latvia and Slovakia.9 10 
As we mentioned above, a potential criticism against using our measure of distance is that it 
does not take into account the “absolute” evaluation of the current or of the past system given by the 
respondents. For instance, the same distance of 70 could characterize someone who likes both the 
past and the present (past = 30; present = 100), someone who dislikes them both (past= -100; present 
= - 30) and someone who dislikes the past but is reasonably satisfied with the present (past = -40; 
present = 30). These absolute evaluations might contain additional information. To take it into 
account we follow a classification introduced by Mishler and Rose (1994) and used in later studies 
by the same authors. Accordingly, we divided our sample in eight different sub-groups as follows. 
Individuals who give positive evaluations to both the present and past economic (or political) 
systems are “positive” (“compliant”). Those who are neutral or negative about both the present and 
past economic (political) systems are “negative” (“skeptic”). Those who evaluate positively the 
present economic (political) system and negatively or neutrally the past are “pro-market” 
(“democrat”). And those who are negative or neutral about the present and positive about the past 
economic (political) system are called “nostalgic” (“reactionary”). Based on this classification, we 
estimate multinomial logit regressions for the probability to be in one of these groups. Marginal 
effects from these regressions are presented in Table 2. 
                                                 
9
 We have also estimated the baseline model keeping in our sample only those individuals who were older than 18 years 
in 1990, since they have had an experience of the old system and thus can compare it directly with the new one. The 
estimates of the rest of the coefficients remained unaffected (with the only exception of the student variable that became 
insignificant in the equation for the political transition). In addition,  we have experimented with excluding Russia or 
Belarus from the sample, and the main results remained qualitatively the same (all results are available upon request). 
10
 Since our dependent variable is, in principle, ordered it is also possible to estimate an ordered probit model. To 
estimate such a model, we coded our “distance“ measure into four ordered categories (from -200 to -100, from -100 to 
0, from 0 to +100, from +100 to +200). The qualitative results were identical to those reported in the text, and are 
available upon request. However, since the quantitative interpretation for this model would be somewhat more 
complicated,  we chose to present only the OLS results. 
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   [Insert Table 2] 
Several facts emerge from this table. First, only few individual characteristics are significant 
for the “positive” and “compliant” groups. Second, the impact of individual characteristics on the 
likelihood of being “pro-market” and “democrat” is qualitatively opposite to the impact for the 
“nostalgic” and “reactionary” groups. For instance, the likelihood of being “pro-market” (see column 
2) is significantly lower for females, unemployed and pensioners and is decreasing with age. On the 
other hand, university graduates are 7 percentage points more likely to be “pro-market” relative to 
those with elementary education, and individuals from the highest household income quartile are 8 
percentage points more likely to belong to this group. Looking at the political system and, again, 
focusing on the group of those who support the change of the system (i.e. “democrats”, column 5), 
we find a very similar impact of most individual characteristics; only the urbanization and pensioner 
variables become insignificant.  
Overall, the results from the multinomial logit analysis reinforce those from the OLS 
regressions above. Individual characteristics shape the pattern of individual evaluations regarding the 
economic and political system in a strong and plausible way. Country effects are also large and 
consistent across different specifications. Most important, this analysis shows that those 
characteristics that determine individual likelihood to belong to a “pro-market” group go in the same 
direction as those that drive his or her attitudes towards more positive evaluation of reforms. In other 
words, those who have higher support attitudes are, consistently, more likely to belong to the “pro-
market” and “democrat” groups, and vice versa. Therefore, this validation exercise adds credibility to 
the interpretation of the OLS regressions as modeling support for reforms and for transition.   
As an additional exercise we also analyze the determinants of individual evaluations by 
countries (not reported, but available upon request). Since the composition of the countries’ sample 
changes throughout the period, such country-specific analysis identifies trends in the support 
attitudes in each country. The individual characteristics included in the regressions were the same as 
in the baseline model above. The only notable exception is the introduction of a minority dummy for 
the Baltic states, as ethnic minorities constitute a significant part of the population in these countries 
(especially in Estonia and Latvia) and the process of transition may have affected them differently 
from the majority of population.11 In general, this exercise reveals some heterogeneity across 
countries. One of the most interesting facts is that the positive effect of belonging to the young 
cohort in the overall sample comes mainly from Russia and, to a lesser extent, Bulgaria (for the 
evaluations of the economic system), and from Estonia, Lithuania and Croatia (for the political 
                                                 
11
  For an analysis of labor market performance of immigrants and non-citizens in the new EU member states see 
Kahanec and Zaiceva (2009). 
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system). Females have a stronger opposition to reforms in the Baltic countries. University education 
does not significantly influence reforms evaluations in Croatia, Romania (economic) and Belarus 
(political). It is remarkable that unemployment does not appear to influence significantly the extent 
of support for economic reforms in Russia nor in Belarus. This could presumably be related to the 
fact that wage arrears rather than layoffs have been prevailing in Russia as a means to reduce the 
burden of labor costs on firms, and that very few reforms at all have taken place in Belarus. On the 
other hand, regarding the evaluation of the political system, our results suggest that unemployment is 
much less important than it is for the economic system, (as it is significant only for Latvia, Bulgaria 
and Croatia, and marginally for Hungary). As expected, belonging to an ethnic minority has a strong 
negative effect in all three Baltic countries, with the largest effect in Estonia. This probably reflects 
the hardship of adjusting to the new system for individuals of Russian origin and their dissatisfaction 
with their economic situation and political rights. Moreover, the negative minority effect is stronger 
for the support of the political reforms than of the economic ones. Finally, regarding year dummies, 
while support for economic transition has generally increased in nine countries out of fourteen from 
1991 until 2004, there is less evidence of an increasing trend in the support for the political 
transition, as the coefficients on the year dummies are positive or insignificant in many cases.12  
Countries where support for change in the political system was lower in the 1990s than in 2004 
include the CIS, Lithuania and, to some extent, Hungary.  
 
b. The importance of individual experiences and preferences 
In the context of our analysis it would be desirable to control for individual heterogeneity in 
preferences, transition experiences and ideology. In this section, we exploit the richness of the data at 
our disposal to do so; in particular we take into account the information on often unobserved aspects 
of individual heterogeneity, such as preferences.   
To introduce this analysis, we first briefly examine the implications that four subjective 
characteristics might have for our model. (i) As we noted above, the experience of individual 
hardship during the transition process may influence personal happiness (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 
2009) and thus also affect individual evaluations of the process of transition. (ii) Also the speed at 
which reforms were actually implemented may influence individual evaluations of the process. As it 
has been suggested in the literature on the optimal speed of transition (Aghion and Blanchard, 1994) 
and on the desirable sequencing of reforms (the “big-bang vs. gradualism debate”, see, e.g., 
McMillan and Havrylyshyn, 2004, Murphy et al., 1992 and Roland, 2002), reforms can be perceived 
                                                 
12
 Note that for Croatia we have information only for 1992 and 1993, with the latter being the reference year. 
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to go too fast or too slow, and in each case an individual assessment of the reform process may 
become more unfavorable. (iii) The extent of corruption in a country may also affect negatively 
individual attitudes towards the process of reforms. (iv) As communism is believed to have shaped 
cultural attitudes towards redistribution (Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln, 2007), it is likely that 
preferences for a more active role of the state in redistributing resources may be negatively correlated 
with individual attitudes towards the process of transition from communism. Thus, it may be 
important to control for these aspects in our baseline regression model.  
In addition, following the literature on the importance of informal institutions and social 
capital, we have also included in the analysis different measures of trust, although – as we noted in 
our previous discussion - many of these variables are subjective measures and are likely to be 
endogenous. In such cases, regression result will only be interpreted as measures of partial 
correlation – which in any case provides useful additional insights. 
[Insert Table 3] 
In Table 3 we show the results of introducing these variables into the baseline model for the 
economic (upper panel) and political (lower panel) evaluations. Results for the other covariates are 
omitted in order to save space, but are available upon request. First, to proxy for individual hardship 
experienced during the transition, we construct two indicators, both of which refer to the year before 
the interview. The first variable (see column 1), measures the total number of weeks, during which a 
person was either unemployed or was not paid salary in full or a payment was delayed. The second 
variable (column 2), is a so-called destitution scale, constructed on the basis of several responses to 
more specific questions in order to reflect the frequency a person or her family had to live without 
food, heating, electricity or clothes.13 The estimated coefficients for both variables are negative, as 
we would expect from the related literature: the more intense is the experience of an economic 
hardship, the lower becomes the support for transitional reforms. Note also that when introducing 
these variables the young cohort dummy becomes insignificant.  
Regarding the speed of reforms, respondents were asked in 1995 and 1996 whether they 
thought that the reform process was going “too fast”, “too slow” or “at the right speed”. The results 
in column (3) indicate that the perceptions of a “wrong” speed of reforms (“too high” or “too slow”) 
influence negatively individual attitudes towards transition. Interestingly, a stronger individual 
resistance is associated with the perception of an excessive speed. Also in this case the young cohort 
dummy becomes insignificant. 
Political preferences or values may be another potentially omitted variable, especially in the 
equation for political reforms. We attempt to proxy for a preference towards dictatorship, using the 
                                                 
13
 This variable was already available in the dataset. 
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following two variables. Survey respondents were asked whether they would approve if the 
Parliament was suspended and whether it would be better “to get rid of Parliament and elections and 
have a strong leader”.  Results in columns (4) and (5) indicate that such preferences are indeed 
significantly and negatively correlated to support for transition, both in the economic and in the 
political dimensions. 
We then attempt to control for the extent of corruption in a country by generating a variable 
that equals 1 if an individual thinks that most or almost all “public officials [in the country] are 
engaged in bribe-taking and corruption” and equals zero if he thinks that “very few” or “less than 
half public officials are corrupt”. Unfortunately, this question was asked only in 2001 and 2004 and 
the sample size drops substantially. Nevertheless, as indicated in column (6), the corruption variable 
is significant and has the expected negative sign for both economic and political attitudes. The 
coefficients on the other individual characteristics remained fairly robust. 
The opinion that the state should engage more actively in redistributing resources across 
individuals may originate either as a cultural preference or as a reaction to current unfavorable 
economic circumstances. In any case, preferences for more redistribution are probably correlated 
with negative attitudes towards the transition from communism. We attribute these preferences to 
those who agree with the statement “Incomes should be made more equal so there is no big 
difference in income” (as opposed to the statement “Individual achievement should determine how 
much people are paid”): as shown in column 7, these respondents also show significant less support 
for transitional reforms. 
In the related empirical literature, age is often used as a proxy for ideology. However, age 
could measure either the increased hardship imposed by transition on older individuals with obsolete 
skills, or, indeed, the fact that their ideological values might have been shaped by communist 
institutions and culture. In fact, as we have shown, older individuals are particularly negative about 
the transition process and are significantly more likely to belong to the “nostalgic” and “reactionary” 
groups. In addition, in column (8) we include a variable, which indicates whether the respondent or 
anyone of his family were formerly members of the Communist Party. As expected, this variable is 
significant and has a negative sign in both tables, suggesting that past party membership is negatively 
correlated with individual support for transition. At the same time, the sign and significance of the 
age dummies is reduced and the young cohort dummy becomes insignificant. This validates our 
suggestion that age is also – but not only – a proxy for ideology.  
Finally, we have introduced several variables that measure the diffusion of trust towards 
political institutions and people (columns 9-12). Our findings suggest that trust towards parties, 
parliament, the president or other people is associated with a more positive assessment of the 
transition.  
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In general, while this descriptive exercise sheds additional light on the characteristics of those 
who are against transitional reforms, the sign and significance of other individual characteristics 
remain fairly robust to the introduction of additional variables and to the related changes in the 
composition and size of the sample. The CIS countries (and in some cases Lithuania) always have 
the lowest average support attitudes. In the next section we search for potential explanations of the 
lower level of support in the CIS countries. 
 
5.  Why is support for transition lower in the CIS countries? 
 
A common finding from the previous sections is that the average level of support for reforms, in both 
the economic and political dimensions, has been different across countries, and reached its lowest in 
the CIS countries. Given the diversity of the initial conditions, of the objectives and sequence of 
reforms, of the paths of political development and of economic performance, it would be surprising if 
citizens from different countries would converge to the same evaluations of their countries’ 
experiences. But why are negative evaluations concentrated in the CIS?  
The CIS and CEE countries shared the experience of a socialist economy with relatively 
secure jobs, officially low inequality and equal pay, but also low motivation and low individual 
responsibility. There were, however, several important differences between these countries, 
including those in their history and in their democratic achievements before socialism (Svejnar, 
2002). First, most Central and Eastern European countries had stronger historical and geographic ties 
and trade relations with Western Europe. These ties – which already provided a closer cultural 
proximity between CEE countries and those in Western Europe - were suddenly “rejuvenated” when 
the perspective of adhesion to the EU became concrete, after German reunification. Second, the CIS 
countries have gone through a longer and more intense communist experience relative to most CEE 
countries: this experience lasted seven decades in the CIS, five in the Baltic countries and four in 
CEE. Third, economic reforms have been implemented using different strategies and policies, and as 
a result the performance of the CIS and CEE countries has also differed. Finally, also the path of 
political liberalization has been different, so much so that in 2004 the Freedom House Ranking of 
political rights and civil liberties still ranged between “not free” for Belarus and “partly free” for 
Russia and Ukraine to “free” for all the CEE countries. Several explanations for these differences in 
economic performance have been suggested in the literature. They include the role of larger safety 
nets and non-employment benefits in the CEE countries, better legal systems and enforcement of 
laws and regulations, a lower degree of corruption and rent seeking than in the CIS. On the basis of 
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this literature, this section explores several potential explanations for the lower support attitudes 
found in the CIS. Although this list of potential explanations is surely not exhaustive, in this section 
we explore the role of individual experiences and preferences (Section 5a) and that of country-
specific economic and institutional factors (Section 5b). 
 
a. Individual experiences, values and preferences 
In order to explore the reasons for the lower support in the CIS countries we again add to our 
baseline model additional variables, measuring individual experiences, values and preferences. If 
these new variables contribute to explain the lower levels of support in the CIS countries, we should 
observe a significant coefficient on these additional terms and at the same time the dummies for 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus should either decrease in magnitude or become insignificant. 
Consistently with our review of the literature, candidate variable for this analysis are individual 
preferences for redistribution and income equality, for state’s responsibility over individuals’ 
material security and for state ownership, as well as for a secure (but also less rewarding) job.  
[Insert Tables 4 and 5] 
Tables 4 and 5 show the estimation results for both economic (Table 4) and political (Table 5) 
support attitudes. The other individual characteristics are the same as in the baseline model. Results 
in each odd-numbered column should be compared with those in the adjacent even-numbered 
column with the same sample size. Since the results are qualitatively similar in both tables, in what 
follows we will discuss them jointly. The essential finding is that the coefficients on the CIS country 
dummies decrease sharply when we introduce in the regression a variable measuring preferences for 
state ownership (columns 12 vs.11, in both Tables). This result is entirely in line with the finding that 
a majority of individuals are not satisfied with privatization and want to revise it (Denisova et al., 
2009). Lack of trust in political institutions also contributes, albeit to a smaller extent, to explain the 
lower support attitudes in the CIS (as may be seen from comparing, in both Tables, columns 1 vs. 2; 
3 vs. 4; and 5 vs.6). 
In addition, we also introduced some variables already included in Table 3, such as transition-
related hardship, opinions on the speed of reforms and on corruption, preferences for a strong leader 
and trust in political institutions. We briefly comment on the consequences of this introduction, 
without reporting the detailed empirical results (which are available on request). In reference to 
transition-related hardship, we found that including the destitution scale decreases the coefficients on 
the CIS country dummies, while the number of weeks without pay or job does not. This seems 
plausible, as it suggests that living without appropriate food and heating matters more than the 
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number of weeks without pay or job. The particular features of labor hoarding and high wage arrears 
in Russia reinforce this interpretation. Second, including opinions on the speed of reforms lowers the 
coefficients for all the CIS country dummies in the equation for economic reforms and for Russia 
and Ukraine in the equation for political reforms. Third, also adding preferences for a dictatorship 
reduces the magnitude of all the CIS dummies, while the inclusion of individual perceptions of 
corruption reduces mostly the dummies for Russia. 
Overall, a preference for state ownership, lack of trust in political institutions, a preference 
towards dictatorship, a reaction against the excessive speed of reforms and perceptions of corruption 
(especially in Russia), are factors that contribute to explain the lower support for transition found in 
the CIS countries. However, although the coefficients on the CIS dummies are diminished in size, 
they do not become insignificant after the inclusion of these additional terms. This suggests that there 
are other important factors that should be explored further.  
 
b. Country-specific performance and institutions 
To complete the picture, we now focus on macro-economic variables and institutional 
indicators of the quality of the economic and political system. Note that in this case we pool together 
individual and country-level variables and standard errors have to be corrected accordingly. The role 
of institutions and policies in affecting individual attitudes in post-communist countries has been 
documented in the literature (see, among others, Denisova et al., 2009; Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 
2009). For example output growth, lower income inequality, less corruption and better governance 
could open up opportunities for improvements for many individuals and thus could be associated 
with a greater support for reforms. On the other hand, as argued by Rodrik (1995) and Fidrmuc 
(1999), especially at the beginning of transition high unemployment may actually signal the need for 
more radical reforms and thus paradoxically reinforce support for reforms. Therefore, the sign on the 
unemployment variable is a priori ambiguous. 
Again in this section we focus on how the introduction of these new variables in the baseline 
model affects the coefficients of the CIS country dummies. Results are reported in Tables 6 and 7 for 
the economic and political systems, respectively.  
[Insert Table 6 and Table 7] 
In order to facilitate comparisons, column (1) in both tables reproduces the results of the 
baseline regressions (Table 1, columns 1 and 5). Individual controls are included in all regressions, 
but are not reported to save space. We first introduce sequentially three traditional macro-economic 
control variables: aggregate unemployment, GDP per capita and inflation. When added sequentially, 
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none of these macroeconomic variables is statistically significant, although adding inflation 
eliminates the significance of the CIS dummies, which suggests that this variable may be affecting 
negatively the level of support for transition in the CIS (equation not reported in the Tables). More 
persuasive results appear when we introduce also the Democracy Index from the Polity IV database 
(column 2 and 314): this raises the absolute value and the significance of the coefficients on the CIS 
dummies (although the coefficient on Ukraine remains insignificant in the equation for the political 
system).  
Two features of the equations in column (2) require specific comments. The first is about why 
the macro-economic variables are generally not-significant.15 On this point, there may be several 
reasons. One is that these variables are included in addition to country and year-specific effects, 
which might better capture the changes in the macro environment. A second reason is that, in 
reference to unemployment, people might care more about their own performance than about 
aggregate unemployment. A third reason may be that left- and right-wing individuals might place 
different weights on unemployment vs. inflation.16 As argued by DiTella and MacCulloch (2005), 
left-wing individuals may care more about unemployment, while right-wingers care more about 
inflation. However these differences may cancel out when averaging across left and right-wing 
individuals, as is done here. A fourth reason is that high unemployment might actually signal the 
need for more reforms (as in Rodrik, 1995), rather than the failure of past ones.  
A second set of comments is required to explain why, in both Tables, a higher level of 
democracy appears to be negatively related to support for transition. Our preferred explanation is 
based on the observation that, for the majority of countries, this indicator does not vary much during 
this period, with the exception of Romania (where it is increasing) and Belarus (where it is 
decreasing). Thus, this variable acts almost as a dummy, essentially separating (with the two 
exceptions just noted) EU from non-EU members, and is thus collinear with the CIS country 
dummies.17 Alternative explanations could follow the one proposed by Guriev and Zhuravskaya 
(2009), who find a negative relation between democracy and the happiness index, and also by 
Denisova et al. (2009), who show that, in more democratic countries, individuals who experience 
economic hardship during transition are more likely to favor re-nationalization.  
                                                 
14 In column (3) we have also added for the lagged EBRD index of transition reforms, to include an indicator of the 
overall progress of transition. This is only marginally significant in the equation measuring economic support (Table 6) 
and, in this case, it renders the unemployment rate also significant, with the expected negative sign. 
15 
 With  the exception noted in the previous footnote. 
16 In addition, there might be a relevant discontinuity in the individual reactions to inflation, as many countries in our 
sample where characterized by hyperinflation in the early 1990s. 
17
 This is consistent with the fact that including the Democracy Index has the effect of increasing the absolute value of 
the CIS country dummies. 
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Holding the level of democracy constant, income inequality may be another reason why 
people have negative attitudes towards the economic or the political system. In line with Guriev and 
Zhuravskaya (2009), we find that the Gini index has a large and significant negative effect in both 
Tables (column 5). This equation is to be compared with that in column 4, which is run on the same 
sub-sample for which the Gini index is available: the effect of including the Gini index on the  CIS 
country dummies are either irrelevant or marginal.18  
Finally, in order to account for the changing quality of political institutions, we added the 
World Bank Governance Indicators (column 7). This equation is to be compared with that in column 
6, which is run on the same sub-sample for which the Governance indicators are available. The 
results reported in Table 6 are remarkable: the inclusion of these indicators eliminates the 
significance of all the CIS country dummies in the equation for the economic transition. (In Table 7, 
for the political transition, the coefficients on the CIS country dummies are insignificant already in 
the sub-sample of columns 6). This suggests that the lower quality of political institutions explains a 
good measure of the lower support for the new economic regime in the CIS countries. In both Tables, 
the Governance Indicators have a significant effect on economic and political attitudes. Especially 
political stability and the rule of law are associated with higher support for both the economic and the 
political regime.   
 
                                                 
18
 To take into account other measures of the deterioration of public goods, we also included several other indicators, 
such as the number of hospital beds, life expectancy, number of doctors, public expenditures on health and education, 
mortality rates of children, immunization rates and enrollment rates in primary, secondary and tertiary education. 
Several of these indicators declined significantly in the CIS countries during the 1999s (see Svejnar, 2002). However, 
the inclusion of these variables does not in general reduce the magnitude or significance of the CIS country dummies 
(detailed results available on request). We also included the Freedom House Ranking of Political Rights Indicator as an 
additional potential explanatory variable. This variable was tested with or without contemporaneous inclusion of the 
Democracy Index, but was generally not significant and did not change the value or significance of the other variables. 
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6. Robustness checks 
 
In this section we briefly present several additional sensitivity checks. As many of our results 
suggest that individual characteristics influence in the same way the evaluation of the economic and 
the political system, we examined the correlation between these evaluations, which in fact is quite 
high (raw correlation = 0.63). We thus run also a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model, 
which fully confirms the results of the OLS estimates, although there is some gain in efficiency for 
individual coefficients (results are not reported, but available on request). 
Second, we have also estimated the baseline models for both the economic and political 
system using non-standardized distance as a dependent variable (see columns 1 and 2 in Table 8). 
The results are qualitatively unchanged from the baseline model with standardized dependent 
variable (column 1 and 5 in Table 1), but can now be interpreted quantitatively in terms of 
corresponding points on the scale from -200 to +200. For example, university graduates assign on 
average 21 (27) additional points to the evaluation of the economic (political) system, relatively to 
the reference category of those with at most elementary education.  
[Insert Table 8] 
Third, we have used a different binary dependent variable, equal to 1 if someone gives higher 
evaluations to the present than to the past system (columns 3 and 4). Again, the results are 
qualitatively identical, both for the individual characteristics and for the country and year dummies. 
Finally, in column 5, we define the dependent variable equal to 1 for those who agree with the 
statement “We should return to Communist rule”. Note that in this case the sample size drops and 
thus the composition of the sample changes. In general, however, the characteristics that affect 
positively (or negatively) the probability of agreeing with this statement are the same as those that 
decrease (or increase) support for transition.  
Thus, we are confident that our results remain robust to the use of different estimators, to 
alternative measures of the dependent variable and to changes in the composition of the sample.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
As the recent EBRD Life in Transition survey remarks, “17 years of transition have taken a 
toll” (EBRD, 2007b). Indeed, there is a certain “transition fatigue” in the region, a discontent with 
transitional reforms, which could be also responsible for the more frequent changes of government 
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which took place in several countries in the more recent years. In this paper we document the extent 
of this discontent in 14 transition countries during 1991-2004 and analyze its determinants.  
We find that the overall support for change in both the economic and political systems has 
been relatively low and heterogeneous across different interest groups and countries. There has been 
an increasing trend in support for the economic changes in many countries, while public support for 
political reforms has been higher and more stable than for the economic reforms. This is consistent 
with the political economy approach that suggests that more popular reforms should be implemented 
first, and with the observation that democratic reforms preceded economic reforms in all Central and 
Eastern Europe, since support for democracy was larger than for economic reforms (Roland, 2002). 
Lower support for reforms is found, in line with the literature, among the older, less educated, 
unemployed and poor individuals and among females, that is those who were more likely to “lose” 
from transition in relative terms, and these negative effects are generally stronger during the period 
of recession in the 1990s. Support for transitional reforms has in general been lower in the CIS 
countries. The effects of almost all country dummies are stronger during the 1990s.  
Our main findings remain robust to changes in the definition of the dependent variable, and to 
specification and sample changes. We also find that the same factors which are related to an aversion 
or lower support for transition are also positively related to a willingness to return to communism. 
However, only one-third of those individuals who evaluate the past socialist economy or communist 
system positively, would actually agree to do so. 
We find evidence that economic difficulties experienced during the transition, individual 
preferences towards dictatorship or redistribution of incomes, opinions on corruption, ex-Communist 
party membership and less trust for politicians or other people, are associated with lower support for 
the transition process. Also, those who think that the reforms were conducted too fast are more likely 
to oppose the transition.  
Finally, we tried to explain why attitudes towards the experience of transition have been so 
markedly lower in the CIS countries. We find evidence that, at the individual level, a preference for 
state ownership, lack of trust in political institutions, a preference towards dictatorship, a reaction 
against the excessive speed of reforms and perceptions of corruption (especially in Russia), 
contribute to explain the lower support for transition in the CIS countries. At the aggregate level, the 
lower quality of political institutions, measured particularly in reference to political stability and to 
the rule of law, explains a good part of the lower support for economic reforms in the CIS countries. 
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Figure 1:  Evaluations of the economic and political systems in 1993 and 2004 
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Source: Authors’ tabulations from the New Barometers data. Sample includes all individuals. 
 
Figure 2: Dynamics of Support, 1991-2004 
  
Source: Authors’ tabulations from the New Barometers data. See text and Appendix for definition of distance. 
Notes: 1996 and 2000 are excluded, since only Russia and the Baltic countries are available for these years. Sample 
includes all individuals. 
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Figure 3: Support for change in the economic and political systems, by country 
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Source: Authors’ tabulations from the New Barometers data, based on final sample used in the regressions. Notes: Slovakia: in 2001 info on marital status is missing, thus sample 
excludes marital status variable; Romania: in 1993 age is missing, thus sample excludes age variable; in 1995 and in 2001 marital status is missing, thus sample excludes marital 
status variable. Slovenia: in 1992 city size variable is missing, thus sample excludes city size variable; in 2001 info on marital status is missing, thus sample excludes marital status 
variable. 
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Figure 4:  
Support for transition and EBRD Transition Indicators
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Source: Authors’ tabulations from the New Barometers data and EBRD Transition Report (2007). Notes: “ti” stands 
for the average of EBRD indicators of the progress in transition for countries in the sample in the respective years. 
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Table 1: Determinants of individual evaluations of reforms  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Economic system Political system 
 1991-2004 1991-2004 1991-98 2000-04 1991-2004 1991-2004 1991-98 2000-04 
Female -0.124** -0.129** -0.140** -0.109** -0.090** -0.090** -0.091** -0.086*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.059) (0.037) (0.032) (0.031) (0.037) (0.027) 
Young_cohort  0.091*** 0.080*** 0.063** 0.107*** 0.077*** 0.066*** 0.045 0.097*** 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.017) (0.018) (0.027) (0.031) 
Age 30-39 -0.046** -0.042** -0.052*** -0.037 -0.038** -0.034** -0.060*** 0.011 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.033) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.036) 
Age 40-49 -0.144*** -0.151*** -0.160*** -0.127** -0.120*** -0.128*** -0.137*** -0.095** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.047) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.038) 
Age 50-59 -0.169*** -0.168*** -0.173*** -0.168*** -0.145*** -0.143*** -0.149*** -0.130*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029) (0.033) (0.037) 
Age>60 -0.106* -0.111** -0.108** -0.155** -0.115** -0.112** -0.120** -0.113* 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.044) (0.067) (0.054) (0.051) (0.055) (0.063) 
Secondary / 0.088*** 0.063** 0.055* 0.104** 0.133*** 0.117*** 0.123*** 0.118** 
vocational (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.042) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.045) 
University  0.289*** 0.255*** 0.232*** 0.325*** 0.335*** 0.313*** 0.314*** 0.321*** 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.035) (0.036) (0.029) (0.023) (0.028) (0.038) 
Single  0.074*** 0.083*** 0.055** 0.125*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.030 0.113*** 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.017) (0.016) (0.023) (0.019) 
Divorced / 0.026 0.036** 0.041** 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.004 0.044 
widowed (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.020) (0.034) 
City  0.096* 0.105** 0.136*** 0.019 0.085 0.093* 0.111** 0.030 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.040) (0.056) (0.050) (0.047) (0.043) (0.056) 
Big town -0.006 0.006 0.016 -0.017 -0.019 -0.000 0.006 -0.031 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.028) (0.027) (0.032) (0.030) (0.035) (0.040) 
Unemployed  -0.149*** -0.138*** -0.140*** -0.155*** -0.112*** -0.099*** -0.113*** -0.096*** 
 (0.034) (0.028) (0.039) (0.032) (0.025) (0.023) (0.030) (0.028) 
Pensioner  -0.054* -0.048 -0.078** 0.020 -0.014 -0.016 -0.017 -0.006 
 (0.031) (0.029) (0.033) (0.031) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.043) 
Student / 0.075*** 0.083*** 0.098*** 0.046* 0.067*** 0.074*** 0.072** 0.066*** 
housewife (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.020) 
2nd hh. income 0.043* 0.054*** 0.028* 0.122*** 0.057** 0.070*** 0.046** 0.127*** 
quartile (0.021) (0.012) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.011) (0.017) (0.037) 
3rd hh. income 0.135*** 0.153*** 0.133*** 0.204*** 0.151*** 0.165*** 0.155*** 0.212*** 
quartile (0.025) (0.016) (0.018) (0.029) (0.021) (0.013) (0.020) (0.039) 
4th hh. income 0.319*** 0.346*** 0.291*** 0.454*** 0.284*** 0.302*** 0.251*** 0.425*** 
quartile (0.039) (0.032) (0.030) (0.044) (0.032) (0.025) (0.026) (0.050) 
Cont. 
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Cont. Table 1 
Czech Republic 0.522***  0.508*** 0.531*** 0.569***  0.560*** 0.554*** 
 (0.015)  (0.023) (0.010) (0.025)  (0.031) (0.013) 
Slovakia  -0.256***  -0.289*** -0.146*** -0.081***  -0.091*** -0.082*** 
 (0.012)  (0.015) (0.008) (0.015)  (0.019) (0.008) 
Hungary  -0.387***  -0.490*** -0.035 -0.310***  -0.407*** -0.014 
 (0.014)  (0.019) (0.062) (0.016)  (0.024) (0.055) 
Poland  0.119***  0.180*** 0.029 0.159***  0.207*** 0.059 
 (0.012)  (0.020) (0.059) (0.017)  (0.026) (0.054) 
Estonia  -0.033  -0.222*** 0.382*** -0.061*  -0.135*** 0.124* 
 (0.035)  (0.057) (0.079) (0.032)  (0.044) (0.063) 
Lithuania  -0.677***  -0.932*** -0.213** -0.300***  -0.454*** -0.022 
 (0.034)  (0.058) (0.076) (0.033)  (0.044) (0.054) 
Latvia  -0.530***  -0.693*** -0.154* -0.323***  -0.403*** -0.121** 
 (0.035)  (0.057) (0.074) (0.033)  (0.045) (0.055) 
Bulgaria  -0.370***  -0.417*** -0.148** -0.069***  -0.007 -0.083* 
 (0.009)  (0.009) (0.053) (0.014)  (0.010) (0.044) 
Romania  -0.101***  -0.068 -0.126*** 0.340***  0.411*** 0.114*** 
 (0.031)  (0.041) (0.013) (0.026)  (0.034) (0.011) 
Croatia  0.220***  0.132***  0.266***  0.204***  
 (0.036)  (0.043)  (0.036)  (0.046)  
Russia  -0.688***  -0.752*** -0.438*** -0.675***  -0.788*** -0.411*** 
 (0.027)  (0.035) (0.075) (0.021)  (0.028) (0.053) 
Ukraine  -1.052***  -1.375*** -0.300*** -0.623***  -0.901*** 0.006 
 (0.019)  (0.023) (0.016) (0.024)  (0.026) (0.016) 
Belarus  -0.749***  -1.000*** 0.098*** -0.530***  -0.712*** 0.095*** 
 (0.023)  (0.029) (0.024) (0.026)  (0.033) (0.021) 
1991 -0.163  -0.006  0.219  0.210  
 (0.134)  (0.101)  (0.142)  (0.124)  
1992 -0.366***  -0.157*  -0.043  0.022  
 (0.115)  (0.086)  (0.108)  (0.126)  
1993 -0.288**  -0.010  0.046  0.139  
 (0.125)  (0.120)  (0.108)  (0.114)  
1995 -0.345**  -0.076  0.025  0.115  
 (0.152)  (0.115)  (0.134)  (0.117)  
1996 -0.213  0.079  0.040  0.165  
 (0.144)  (0.120)  (0.096)  (0.102)  
1998 -0.248    -0.086    
 (0.148)    (0.156)    
2000 -0.316**   -0.357** -0.087   -0.144** 
 (0.129)   (0.130) (0.087)   (0.055) 
2001 0.041   0.061 -0.001   0.015 
 (0.105)   (0.102) (0.090)   (0.088) 
Constant -0.093 -0.392*** -0.208** -0.492*** 0.006 -0.195*** 0.001 -0.275*** 
 (0.135) (0.054) (0.095) (0.059) (0.120) (0.044) (0.095) (0.066) 
Country*year 
dummies 
No Yes No No No Yes No No 
Observations 72012 72012 49376 22636 70532 70532 48375 22157 
R-squared 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.12 
Notes:  Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10 
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Dependent variable is the standardized distance 
between the rankings of present and past economic or political systems. Reference individual is male, age 20-29, cohort 
between 18 and 55 years old in 1990, less than secondary school education, married, living in rural or small town, 
employed, with household income in the 1st quartile. Reference country and year: Slovenia, 2004. In columns (3) and 
(7) reference year is 1998, in columns (4) and (8) reference year is 2004.  
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Table 2. Determinants of adhesion to a group, 1991-2004 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Economic system Political system 
 Positive Pro-market Nostalgic Compliant Democrat Reactionary 
Female -0.015      
(0.012) 
-0.022***      
(0.007) 
0.053***      
(0.020) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.035*** 
(0.009) 
0.030** 
(0.013) 
Young_cohort 0.015 
(0.012) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.041*** 
(0.012) 
0.010 
(0.012) 
0.019** 
(0.008) 
-0.037*** 
(0.009) 
Age 30-39 -0.003     
(0.006) 
-0.012**      
(0.006) 
0.014*       
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.014* 
(0.007) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
Age 40-49 -0.013      
(0.009) 
-0.030***      
(0.005) 
0.063***      
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.039*** 
(0.009) 
0.056*** 
(0.009) 
Age 50-59 -0.002      
(0.008) 
-0.034***      
(0.006) 
0.061***      
(0.012) 
0.019* 
(0.011) 
-0.045*** 
(0.010) 
0.065*** 
(0.014) 
Age>60 0.001      
(0.014) 
-0.019*      
(0.011) 
0.038      
(0.023) 
0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.032* 
(0.017) 
0.057*** 
(0.021) 
Secondary / 
vocational 
0.003      
(0.006) 
0.019***      
(0.007) 
-0.031***      
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
0.042*** 
(0.010) 
-0.042*** 
(0.008) 
University -0.001      
(0.010) 
0.066***      
(0.008) 
-0.111***      
(0.013) 
-0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.114*** 
(0.011) 
-0.104*** 
(0.009) 
Single -0.002      
(0.007) 
0.011*      
(0.006) 
-0.029***      
(0.007) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.017** 
(0.009) 
-0.018*** 
(0.007) 
Divorced / 
widowed 
-0.003      
(0.004) 
0.003     
(0.004) 
-0.008       
(0.006) 
-0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.000 
(0.008) 
City  -0.011      
(0.010) 
0.025**      
(0.011) 
-0.051***      
(0.016) 
-0.024* 
(0.014) 
0.026 
(0.020) 
-0.031* 
(0.016) 
Big town 0.002      
(0.007) 
0.004      
(0.005) 
-0.010      
(0.009) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.001       
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
Unemployed  -0.006      
(0.007) 
-0.028***      
(0.005) 
0.048***      
(0.011) 
0.002      
(0.008) 
-0.039*** 
(0.007) 
0.045*** 
(0.010) 
Pensioner  0.009      
(0.010) 
-0.017**      
(0.007) 
0.021*      
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.010) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
Student / 
housewife 
0.011      
(0.008) 
0.014**      
(0.006) 
-0.038***      
(0.007) 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.035*** 
(0.009) 
-0.019* 
(0.011) 
2nd hh. income 
quartile 
0.015***      
(0.004) 
0.010***      
(0.004) 
-0.033***      
(0.006) 
0.005        
(0.004) 
0.021*** 
(0.005) 
-0.024*** 
(0.003) 
3rd hh. income 
quartile 
0.030***      
(0.005) 
0.029***      
(0.003) 
-0.069***      
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.052*** 
(0.004) 
-0.055*** 
(0.005) 
4th hh. income  
quartile 
0.045***     
(0.006) 
0.078***      
(0.0010) 
-0.152***       
(0.012) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.106*** 
(0.009) 
-0.103*** 
(0.008) 
Observations 17389 9779 31271 17323 18684 19674 
Observations 72012 70532 
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.09 
Notes:   Marginal effects from multinomial logit.  Standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses.       
  * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Additional regressors include 
interactions between country and year dummies. Baseline groups are negative and skeptic, for economic and political 
outcomes, respectively.  
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Table 3. The impact of additional variables on individual evaluations  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Nr. weeks 
hardship 
Doing 
without 
Ref. fast + 
Ref. slow 
Parliament 
suspend Leader Corruption 
Equal 
income 
Ex-
communist Trust parties 
Trust 
Parliament 
Trust 
president Trust people 
Dependent 
variable: Support for change in the economic system 
 
-0.003*** -0.061*** -0.496*** -0.301*** -0.287*** -0.313*** -0.218*** -0.210*** 0.081*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.023* 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.050) (0.036) (0.024) (0.032) (0.025) (0.027) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) 
   -0.280***          
   (0.047)          
Observations 27834 33608 14392 60607 59298 16040 37363 18271 53698 54279 51135 25092 
R-squared 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.24 0.25 0.15 0.24 0.33 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.19 
             
Dependent 
variable: Support for change in the political system 
 
-0.003*** -0.049*** -0.443*** -0.383*** -0.376*** -0.333*** -0.288*** -0.251*** 0.093*** 0.095*** 0.102*** 0.032*** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.037) (0.060) (0.023) (0.036) (0.024) (0.034) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.010) 
   -0.168***          
   (0.045)          
Observations 27219 33011 14131 59771 58238 15730 36543 18147 52854 53390 50274 24741 
R-squared 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.12 0.20 0.27 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.16 
Notes:  Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
For definitions of the variables, see text and Data Appendix. Additional controls include country and year dummies interactions. 
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Table 4.    Role of individual preferences in explaining the lower evaluation of economic reforms in the CIS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 Trustpart Trustpart Trustparl Trustparl Trustpres Trustpres Equalinc Equalinc Stateresp Stateresp Stateprop Stateprop Securejob Securejob 
Belarus -0.822*** -0.818*** -0.827*** -0.839*** -0.831*** -0.815*** -0.606*** -0.623*** -0.613*** -0.609*** -0.621*** -0.521*** -0.551*** -0.582*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.019) (0.009) (0.010) 
Ukraine -1.095*** -1.076*** -1.095*** -1.046*** -1.104*** -1.016*** -1.004*** -1.007*** -1.007*** -0.986*** -1.019*** -0.910*** -0.788*** -0.806*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.024) (0.032) (0.032) 
Russia -0.697*** -0.646*** -0.708*** -0.628*** -0.709*** -0.620*** -0.549*** -0.532*** -0.554*** -0.560*** -0.574*** -0.451*** -0.546*** -0.592*** 
 (0.047) (0.049) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047) (0.053) (0.088) (0.091) (0.088) (0.082) (0.089) (0.091) (0.080) (0.082) 
Trustpart  0.092***             
  (0.018)             
Trustparl    0.100***           
    (0.015)           
Trustpres      0.086***         
      (0.011)         
Equalinc        -0.228***       
        (0.027)       
Stateresp          -0.306***     
          (0.027)     
Stateprop            -0.384***   
            (0.030)   
Securejob              -0.193*** 
              (0.033) 
Constant -0.094 -0.347** -0.085 -0.415*** -0.072 -0.497*** -0.197 -0.092 -0.199 -0.023 -0.198 -0.042 -0.200 -0.071 
 (0.138) (0.136) (0.137) (0.123) (0.138) (0.141) (0.157) (0.152) (0.155) (0.143) (0.158) (0.143) (0.128) (0.124) 
Observations 53698 53698 54279 54279 51135 51135 37363 37363 37261 37261 36164 36164 26921 26921 
R-squared 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.16 0.16 
Notes: Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
Additional controls include individual characteristics as in Table 1, country fixed effects and year dummies.
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Table 5. Role of individual preferences in explaining the lower evaluation of political reforms in the CIS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 Trustpart Trustpart Trustparl Trustparl Trustpres Trustpres Equalinc Equalinc Stateresp Stateresp Stateprop Stateprop Securejob Securejob 
Belarus -0.586*** -0.581*** -0.592*** -0.604*** -0.595*** -0.573*** -0.403*** -0.423*** -0.409*** -0.408*** -0.415*** -0.297*** -0.416*** -0.449*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.022) (0.008) (0.010) 
Ukraine -0.715*** -0.695*** -0.715*** -0.660*** -0.717*** -0.606*** -0.586*** -0.589*** -0.593*** -0.576*** -0.613*** -0.487*** -0.391*** -0.408*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Russia -0.653*** -0.596*** -0.663*** -0.574*** -0.662*** -0.550*** -0.624*** -0.602*** -0.632*** -0.638*** -0.642*** -0.495*** -0.609*** -0.655*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.038) (0.089) (0.091) (0.090) (0.087) (0.089) (0.093) (0.058) (0.062) 
Trustpart  0.102***             
  (0.020)             
Trustparl    0.109***           
    (0.019)           
Trustpres      0.107***         
      (0.016)         
Equalinc        -0.285***       
        (0.024)       
Stateresp          -0.266***     
          (0.034)     
Stateprop            -0.456***   
            (0.031)   
Securejob              -0.202*** 
              (0.033) 
Constant 0.001 -0.277** 0.010 -0.350*** 0.034 -0.502*** -0.051 0.079 -0.049 0.107 -0.055 0.131 -0.073 0.062 
 (0.121) (0.125) (0.121) (0.109) (0.119) (0.127) (0.156) (0.153) (0.156) (0.146) (0.154) (0.141) (0.105) (0.110) 
Observations 52854 52854 53390 53390 50274 50274 36543 36543 36433 36433 35442 35442 26207 26207 
R-squared 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.12 0.13 
Notes: Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
Additional controls include individual characteristics as in Table 1, country fixed effects and year dummies. 
 
 36 
 
 
Table 6: Role of macroeconomic and institutional determinants in explaining the 
lower evaluation of economic reforms in the CIS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Belarus -0.749*** -1.519** -1.347** -3.064** -3.196*** -3.146* 0.197 
 (0.023) (0.519) (0.481) (1.024) (0.877) (1.565) (1.368) 
Ukraine -1.052*** -1.412*** -1.288*** -2.351** -2.059** -2.600** 0.137 
 (0.019) (0.460) (0.421) (0.778) (0.729) (1.146) (1.125) 
Russia -0.688*** -1.086** -1.024*** -1.984*** -1.377* -2.133** 1.399 
 (0.027) (0.362) (0.333) (0.635) (0.669) (0.926) (1.089) 
Unempl. Rate  -0.013 -0.017** -0.040** -0.044*** -0.047 0.005 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.017) (0.014) (0.030) (0.019) 
GDP p.c.  -0.001 -0.003 -0.071 -0.077 -0.109 -0.138* 
  (0.039) (0.035) (0.056) (0.052) (0.084) (0.071) 
Inflation  -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Democracy  -0.092*** -0.096*** -0.157*** -0.151*** -0.136 -0.111** 
  (0.019) (0.021) (0.050) (0.048) (0.077) (0.045) 
Tr. Indic.(t-1)   0.185*     
   (0.099)     
Gini     -3.785***   
     (0.994)   
Gov. Indic.        
        
Voice       -0.014** 
       (0.006) 
Pol. Stab.       0.038*** 
       (0.007) 
Gov. effect.       -0.010 
       (0.007) 
Regul. qual.       0.012* 
       (0.006) 
Rule of law       0.032*** 
       (0.007) 
Control corr.       -0.000 
       (0.008) 
Constant -0.093 0.991 0.445 3.008* 4.088*** 3.529 -1.304 
 (0.135) (0.874) (0.836) (1.541) (1.150) (2.192) (1.901) 
Observations 72012 72012 72012 48967 48967 40420 40420 
R-squared 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.23 
 Notes:    Estimation method: OLS.   Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses.   * 
significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. For definitions of 
macro and institutional variables, see text and Data Appendix. Additional controls include 
individual characteristics as in Table 1 and year dummies. 
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Table 7: Role of macroeconomic and institutional determinants in explaining the 
lower evaluation of political reforms in the CIS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Belarus -0.530*** -0.962* -0.937* -1.697 -1.799 -2.119 -1.063 
 (0.026) (0.483) (0.457) (1.175) (1.044) (2.066) (1.336) 
Ukraine -0.623*** -0.678 -0.660 -1.149 -0.960 -1.755 -0.991 
 (0.024) (0.453) (0.437) (0.895) (0.848) (1.453) (1.099) 
Russia -0.675*** -0.851** -0.842** -1.267 -0.864 -1.639 -0.063 
 (0.021) (0.337) (0.327) (0.715) (0.731) (1.173) (0.973) 
Unempl. Rate  -0.011 -0.011 -0.027* -0.030** -0.040 -0.017 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.013) (0.029) (0.026) 
GDP p.c.  0.018 0.018 -0.016 -0.020 -0.084 -0.176* 
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.065) (0.060) (0.101) (0.082) 
Inflation  -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000 -0.001 -0.001** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Democracy  -0.080*** -0.081*** -0.118* -0.114** -0.085 -0.083 
  (0.024) (0.026) (0.056) (0.051) (0.103) (0.049) 
Tr. Indic.(t-1)   0.027     
   (0.106)     
Gini     -2.570***   
     (0.773)   
Gov. Indic.        
        
Voice       -0.016** 
       (0.006) 
Pol. Stab.       0.021** 
       (0.007) 
Gov. Effect.       -0.005 
       (0.007) 
Regul. Qual.       0.004 
       (0.005) 
Rule of law       0.045*** 
       (0.009) 
Control corr.       -0.012 
       (0.007) 
Constant -0.006 0.590 0.510 1.602 2.353 2.652 1.218 
 (0.120) (0.847) (0.793) (1.777) (1.453) (2.838) (1.968) 
Observations 70532 70532 70532 48165 48165 39666 39666 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.17 
Notes:   Estimation method: OLS.  Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. * significant 
at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. For definitions of macro and 
institutional variables, see text and Data Appendix. Additional controls include individual 
characteristics as in Table 1 and year dummies. 
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Table 8:    Robustness checks 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable: Distance_Econ. Distance_Pol. Higher_Econ.  Higher_Pol.  
Return to 
Communism  
Estimation 
method OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit 
Female -9.003** -7.367** -0.042*** -0.050*** 0.019*** 
 (3.395) (2.584) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) 
Young_Cohort 7.292*** 6.109*** 0.035*** 0.041*** -0.010 
 (1.336) (1.297) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
Age3039 -3.403** -3.085** -0.017* -0.007 0.017 
 (1.192) (1.057) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) 
Age4049 -10.509*** -9.574*** -0.053*** -0.049*** 0.069*** 
 (1.761) (1.327) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Age5059 -12.416*** -11.756*** -0.070*** -0.060*** 0.081*** 
 (1.798) (2.180) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) 
Age60m -7.977** -9.565** -0.043** -0.043* 0.079*** 
 (3.388) (4.097) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) 
Secvocat 6.722** 10.916*** 0.036*** 0.065*** -0.078*** 
 (2.473) (2.497) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) 
Uni 21.154*** 26.859*** 0.125*** 0.166*** -0.127*** 
 (2.082) (2.534) (0.013) (0.014) (0.007) 
Single 4.966*** 3.847** 0.028*** 0.041*** -0.013 
 (1.643) (1.469) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Divwid 2.255* 1.856 0.002 0.010 0.008 
 (1.217) (1.728) (0.004) (0.010) (0.009) 
City1 7.870** 7.386* 0.039** 0.031 -0.038*** 
 (3.516) (4.096) (0.019) (0.027) (0.015) 
Bigt1 -0.054 -1.446 0.002 -0.014 0.000 
 (1.845) (2.540) (0.011) (0.017) (0.009) 
Unemployed -11.420*** -9.170*** -0.053*** -0.059*** 0.043*** 
 (2.435) (2.053) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) 
Pens -4.075* -1.257 -0.026** -0.018 0.027*** 
 (2.261) (2.052) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) 
Hwstudent 5.125*** 5.475*** 0.030*** 0.034*** -0.003 
 (1.131) (1.454) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) 
Hhincq2 3.616** 4.732** 0.020*** 0.024** -0.026** 
 (1.411) (1.590) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) 
Hhincq3 10.363*** 12.247*** 0.046*** 0.067*** -0.060*** 
 (1.769) (1.643) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) 
Hhincq4 23.994*** 23.199*** 0.118*** 0.125*** -0.099*** 
 (2.796) (2.603) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) 
Cont. 
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Cont. Table 8 
CZ 36.912*** 48.007*** 0.258*** 0.269*** -0.053*** 
 (1.183) (1.839) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) 
SK -21.011*** -4.491*** -0.064*** 0.010 0.095*** 
 (0.854) (1.131) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
HU -24.958*** -21.749*** -0.103*** -0.098*** 0.032*** 
 (1.113) (1.263) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) 
PL 4.998*** 12.827*** 0.078*** 0.085*** 0.035*** 
 (1.078) (1.354) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
EE -2.403 -2.133 0.033** 0.008 -0.078*** 
 (2.621) (2.314) (0.015) (0.014) (0.007) 
LT -48.400*** -21.990*** -0.159*** -0.105*** -0.057*** 
 (2.543) (2.417) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) 
LV -36.907*** -22.350*** -0.131*** -0.125*** -0.096*** 
 (2.610) (2.409) (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) 
BU -36.318*** -1.789 -0.101*** -0.023*** 0.120*** 
 (0.649) (1.140) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) 
RO -10.190*** 28.225*** -0.033*** 0.142*** 0.000 
 (2.261) (2.064) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
CR 12.733*** 18.710*** 0.060*** 0.067*** -0.056*** 
 (2.476) (2.894) (0.015) (0.013) (0.009) 
RU -49.763*** -49.841*** -0.182*** -0.260*** 0.256*** 
 (2.184) (1.553) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) 
UA -67.781*** -49.141*** -0.200*** -0.215*** 0.235*** 
 (1.330) (1.815) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) 
BY -47.614*** -40.117*** -0.152*** -0.171*** 0.244*** 
 (1.659) (1.871) (0.004) (0.011) (0.009) 
YR91 -7.585 16.783 -0.065* 0.096  
 (9.395) (12.188) (0.037) (0.060)  
YR92 -22.513*** -2.674 -0.109*** -0.022  
 (6.859) (9.048) (0.025) (0.044)  
YR93 -19.093** 2.890 -0.095*** 0.005 -0.038* 
 (7.821) (8.731) (0.032) (0.046) (0.020) 
YR95 -24.157** -0.013 -0.092** -0.002 -0.009 
 (10.586) (10.873) (0.040) (0.056) (0.035) 
YR96 -17.959* 1.145 -0.076* -0.016 -0.016 
 (9.210) (7.822) (0.039) (0.042) (0.019) 
YR98 -18.150* -6.444 -0.084*** -0.042 0.025 
 (10.088) (13.020) (0.032) (0.060) (0.034) 
YR00 -26.082** -8.820 -0.088** -0.051 0.011 
 (9.986) (7.309) (0.037) (0.038) (0.031) 
YR01 0.813 -0.764 0.014 -0.010 0.020 
 (8.133) (7.643) (0.037) (0.039) (0.026) 
Constant -7.396 -2.619    
 (9.297) (10.120)    
Observations 72012 70532 72012 70532 54553 
R-squared 0.18 0.16    
Notes:    Standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 
5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Reference individual is male, age 20-29, cohort between 18 and 55 years old 
in 1990, less than secondary school education, married, living in rural or small town, employed, with household 
income in the 1st quartile. Reference country and year: Slovenia, 2004.  
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Data Appendix 
a. Data acknowledgements and copyright 
This research was based on the data from the New Europe Barometer (waves I-VII), New 
Russia Barometer (waves I-XIII) and New Baltic Barometer (waves I-VI). These data have been 
produced by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Aberdeen / University of 
Strathclyde and by Richard Rose (U. of Aberdeen) and William Mishler (U. of Arizona). The data 
have been supplied by the UK Data Archive, under Crown copyright. The original data creators, 
depositors or copyright holders and the UK Data Archive bear no responsibility for our analysis or 
interpretation of these data.  
The following data were obtained directly from the UK Data Archive: 
Rose, R., New Europe Barometer I-V, 1991-1998 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data 
Archive [distributor], October 2005. SN: 5241. 
Rose, R., New Europe Barometer VI, 2001 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive 
[distributor], October 2005. SN: 5242.  
Rose, R. and Mishler, W., New Europe Barometer VII, 2004-2005 [computer file]. Colchester, 
Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], July 2007. SN: 5243.  
Rose, R., New Russia Barometer, 2000-2001 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive 
[distributor], November 2003. SN: 4550.  
Rose, R., New Russia Barometer XIII, 2004 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive 
[distributor], August 2007. SN: 5700.  
 
b. Tables and Figures 
Table A1: Sample size by country 
 1991 1992 1993 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2004 Total 
Bulgaria 892 0 1035 1043 0 766 0 1086 1130 5952 
Czech Republic 611 1187 998 822 0 0 0 0 768 4386 
Slovakia 264 522 458 932 0 777 0 0 848 3801 
Hungary 756 594 818 876 0 0 0 650 474 4168 
Poland 941 962 763 819 0 0 0 629 590 4704 
Romania 949 956 0 0 0 1043 0 0 792 3740 
Croatia 0 982 989 0 0 0 0 0 0 1971 
Slovenia 835 0 810 631 0 610 0 0 753 3639 
Belarus 0 0 874 888 0 959 0 0 713 3434 
Ukraine 0 624 816 834 0 801 0 0 1578 4653 
Russia 0 1974 1741 1765 2310 1544 1686 1821 1820 14661 
Estonia 0 0 1474 1053 839 0 593 826 721 5506 
Latvia 0 0 1346 855 729 0 648 732 769 5079 
Lithuania 0 0 1688 766 855 0 960 1059 990 6318 
Total 5248 7801 13810 11284 4733 6500 3887 6803 11946 72012 
Source: Authors’ tabulations form the New Barometer Surveys.  
Notes: finals sample includes respondents with non-missing information on the key explanatory variables (as well as 
support for economic reforms).  
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Table A2: Variables definitions and sources 
Variable Description and sources 
Dependent variables: 
 
Distec  / Distpol 
 
 
 
 
Positive, Negative, Nostalgic, 
Pro-Market  / 
Compliant, Skeptic, 
Reactionary, Democrat 
 
 
 
Distance between present and past evaluations of the economic / political system. 
Constructed as the difference between individual rankings of the functioning of the 
present economic / political system, and the past socialist economy / political 
system.  Ranges from -200 and +200 and is treated as continuous. 
 
Two groups of binary mutually exclusive variables defining whether individual 
belongs to a specific group based on his evaluations of past and present economic / 
political systems.  
 
 
Source: New Europe Barometers, New Russian Barometers, New Baltic Barometers. 
 
Independent individual 
characteristics: 
 
Female 
 
Age<30 
 
Age 30-39 
 
Age 40-49 
 
Age 50-59 
 
Age>60 
 
Elementary education 
 
Secondary or vocational 
education 
 
University  
 
Married  
 
Single  
 
Divorced or widowed 
 
Small town or rural 
 
 
Big town 
 
 
City 
 
 
Employed 
 
 
Unemployed  
 
 
Pensioner 
 
Student or housewife 
 
 
1st hh. income quartile  
 
 
2nd hh. income quartile 
 
 
 
 
 
Dummy equals to 1 if individual is female 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual’s age is less than 30 years old (Reference category) 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual’s age is greater than 30 and less than 39 years old 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual’s age is greater than 40 and less than 49 years old 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual’s age is greater than 50 and less than 59 years old 
 
Dummy equals 1 if age is greater than 60 years old 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual has elementary education (Reference category) 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual has secondary or vocational education 
 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual has university degree 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual is married or cohabiting (Reference category) 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual is single 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual is divorced separated or widowed 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual resides in a small town or rural area (with population 
less or equal to 5000; in Russia <20000) (Reference category) 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual resides in a big town (with population greater than 
5000 and less than 100000; in Russia – between 20000 and 1000000) 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual resides in a city including capital (with population 
>100000; in Russia >1000000) 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual is employed (full-time part-time family helper 
apprentice or self-employed including and working pensioners in some countries) 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual is unemployed (including both with and without benefits 
in Russia) 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual is a pensioner 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual is a house-keeper or a student since in several 
countries it was not possible to disentangle these two categories.  
 
Dummy equals 1 if household is in the first quartile of the country-specific income 
distribution (Reference category) 
 
Dummy equals 1 if household is in the second quartile of the country-specific income 
distribution 
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3rd hh. income quartile 
 
 
4th hh. income quartile 
 
 
Minority 
 
 
Number of weeks with 
hardship   
 
Doing without 
 
 
 
Reforms right 
 
 
Reforms fast 
 
 
Reforms slow 
 
 
Parliament suspend 
 
 
Leader 
 
 
Corruption 
 
 
 
 
Equal income 
 
 
 
 
Return to Communism 
 
 
Ex-Communist 
 
 
Trust parties 
 
 
Trust Parliament 
 
 
Trust President 
 
 
Trust people 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macroeconomic variables and 
political institutions: 
 
Unemployment rate 
 
 
 
 
GDP per capita 
 
Dummy equals 1 if household is in the third quartile of the country-specific income 
distribution 
 
Dummy equals 1 if household is in the fourth quartile of the country-specific income 
distribution 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual belongs to an ethnic minority in a country (in the Baltic 
States) 
 
Number of weeks during which a person was either unemployed or salary was 
delayed or not paid in full last year (1993, 1995, 1996, 1998) 
 
Destitution scale, to indicate the degree of hardship experienced (increasing from 0 
to 9) based on information whether a person or his family had to live without food, 
heating, electricity or clothes (1993 – 2001)    
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual thinks that reforms in his country are being conducted 
at the right speed (Reference category) (1995, 1996)  
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual thinks that reforms in his country are going too fast 
(1995, 1996) 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual thinks that reforms in his country are going too slow 
(1995, 1996) 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual would approve if the Parliament was suspended (1991 - 
2004) 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual agrees with the statement: it would be better to get rid 
of Parliament and elections and have a strong leader (1992-2004) 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual thinks that most or almost all “public officials are 
engaged in bribe-taking and corruption” in his country and equals zero if he thinks 
that “very few” or “less than half public officials are corrupt” (2001, 2004). 
 
 
Dummy that equals 1 if individual agrees with the statement that “incomes should be 
made more equal so there is no big difference in income” as opposed to the 
statement “Individual achievement should determine how much people are paid” 
(1992, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2004) 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual agrees with the statement “We should return to 
Communist rule” (1993-2004) 
 
Dummy equals 1 if individual or his family were members of the Communist party 
(1993, 1995, 1998) 
 
Variable indicating the degree of individual’s trust in political parties (ranges from 1 
to 7) (1992-2004) 
 
Variable indicating the degree of individual’s trust in Parliament (ranges from 1 to 7) 
(1992-2004) 
 
Variable indicating the degree of individual’s trust in President (ranges from 1 to 7) 
(1993-2004) 
 
Variable indicating the degree of individual’s trust in people of his country (ranges 
from 1 to 7) (1998-2004) 
 
Source: New Europe Barometers, New Russian Barometers, New Baltic Barometers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unemployment rate (Source: EBRD. For Belarus the data are from IMF International 
Financial Statistics CD Rom for Ukraine – from World Development Indicators CD 
Rom for Estonia in 1990 and 1991 – from the World Development Indicators online 
database) 
 
GDP per capita PPP (constant 2000 international $) (Source: World Development 
Indicators online database) 
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Inflation 
 
 
EBRD Transition Indicators 
 
 
Hospital beds 
 
 
Gini Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Democracy 
 
 
Governance 
 
 
 
 
Inflation GDP deflator (annual percent) (Source: World Development Indicators 
online database) 
 
Average of EBRD indicators of the progress in transition lagged one year (Source: 
EBRD 2007) 
 
Hospital beds per 1000 of people in a country (Source: World Development 
Indicators CD Rom) 
 
Gini index (Source: Transmonee dataset, http://www.transmonee.org/). For Bulgaria 
Czech Republic Estonia Latvia Lithuania Ukraine Croatia and Belarus 1990 is used 
instead of 1991. In Latvia 1997 is used instead of 1995 and 2000 instead of 2001. 
For Lithuania 1996 is used instead of 1995. For Russia instead of 1993 use 1994. For 
Slovakia instead of 1995 use 1996. For Slovenia and Ukraine instead of 2004 use 
2002 
 
Democracy Indicator, based on an additive eleven-point scale (0-10) (Source: Polity 
IV) 
 
Average of the World Bank Governance Indicators  
(Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp ).  
Based on the following six indicators:  Voice and Accountability / Political Stability / 
Government Effectiveness / Regulatory Quality / Rule of Law / Control of Corruption. 
 Note: data from 1996 is used instead of 1995, and from 2002 instead of 2001 
 
 
 
